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 1 Introduction
Despite the widespread use of the matched sample estimation approach in ﬁnance, very little
is known about the sensitivity of results to the matching technique used. This paper aims
to ﬁll in this vacuum by illustrating how the bias and variance of matching estimates inﬂu-
ence the empirical power of tests for differences in transaction costs, as commonly studied
in market microstructure. To provide a vehicle for the analysis, we estimate the effect of be-
ing interlisted on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and a US exchange on the percentage
bid-ask spread in Toronto and examine whether this coincides with changes in market maker
participation or with changes in institutional order ﬂow.
The matched sample approach compares the trading properties of each interlisted stock
with an otherwise similar non-interlisted stock. This approach is one way to overcome the
problem that, in general, it is not possible to observe what the trading properties of interlisted
stocks would be if they were not listed on a US exchange. Similar matched sample estimation
approaches are frequently used in the ﬁnance literature. In market microstructure, matched
samples are often used to compare execution costs on different exchanges or across differ-
ent groups of stocks. For example, execution costs on the NYSE and the Nasdaq have been
compared by constructing matched samples of NYSE-listed ﬁrms and “comparable” Nasdaq-
listed ﬁrms.1 Matched sample techniques are also used in a vast variety of other research
areas of ﬁnance, such as: forced CEO succession (Farrell and Whidbee (2000)), media visibil-
ity of ﬁrms on NYSE and Nasdaq (Baker et al. (1998)), stock return comovements (Karoyli
and Stulz (1996)), and countless other applications.
1For example, Huang and Stoll (1996) construct matched samples of NYSE- and Nasdaq- listed ﬁrms using
a nearest-neighbor approach that ﬁrst grouped ﬁrms by Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes and then
minimized the difference between four criteria (long-term debt level, book value, share price, number of shares
outstanding). Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) extend Huang and Stoll’s study to consider small and medium
capitalization ﬁrms. Later, Bessembinder (1999) conducts a similar analysis using size matched ﬁrms to examine
whether new order-handling rules introduced on the Nasdaq in 1997 impacted the previously reported differences
in trade execution costs on the two exchanges. Venkataraman (2001) also uses the matched sample approach to
compare trade execution costs on the Paris Bourse and the NYSE.
1Despite the existence of more sophisticated matching estimation techniques2 (e.g. those
commonly used to measure treatment effects in medical research and in labor economics),
most ﬁnance applications use the standard nearest neighbor matching estimation approach.
With this in mind, our goal is to use Monte Carlo simulation to investigate whether the size-
power properties of tests for differences in trade execution costs (between interlisted and non-
interlisted stocks) can be improved by using different weighting schemes for nearest-neighbor
estimation techniques or by using kernel-based matching estimation techniques. Essentially,
these alternative estimators weight closest neighbors by more, but still place some weight
on more distant neighbors. The potential beneﬁt is that these estimators are less sensitive
to a mis-match along un-measured dimensions, but the cost is that they introduce an added
mis-match along measured dimensions.
We ﬁnd evidence that the commonly used nearest neighbor matching approach (based on
a one-to-one matching of ﬁrms) typically performs the best in market microstructure appli-
cations, despite its apparent simplicity. This is important, because many researchers unnec-
essarily apologize for using the nearest neighbor approach without being fully aware of its
statistical properties. In comparison with the alternative estimators considered, the nearest
neighbor approach has less bias and thus less probability of type I error (rejecting the null
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true). When the number of matched pairs is small,
however, additional test power and narrower conﬁdence intervals may be obtained by using
a matching estimation technique that places additional weight on more distant ﬁrms (e.g.
kernel-based matching estimates).
Based on the lessons gained from our simulation results, we measure the effect on the
percentage bid-ask spread in Toronto of a TSE-listed stock being interlisted on a US exchange.
Theory suggests that becoming interlisted on a US exchange could have two possible effects
on transaction costs. On the one hand, Mendelson (1987) describes a scenario in which an
additional trading venue could cause the market to become ‘fragmented’, reducing liquidity
and increasing the bid-ask spread. On the other hand, Hamilton (1979) provides a model in
2Some of these techniques include: regression-adjusted matching, local linear matching, subclassiﬁcation, and
propensity score matching.
2which the additional trading venue would increase competition among market makers and
lead to lower transaction costs.
The potential negative effects of market fragmentation will be offset if the addition of an
American trading venue allows new US investors to enter the market that were previously
unable to. Becoming listed on a US exchange increases US media coverage of the ﬁrm and
reduces investment barriers, either real or perceived, for potential US investors. Empirical
studies by Booth and Johnston (1984), Jorion and Schwartz (1986), Mittoo (1992), Foerster
and Karolyi (1993) and Karolyi (1998) ﬁnd evidence of segmentation between Canadian and
US equity markets.3 Doukas and Switzer (2000) ﬁnd evidence that this segmentation has per-
sisted despite institutional changes which should have enhanced capital market integration
between the two markets. Ahn, et al. (1998) show that despite an economically signiﬁcant
reduction in the spread on the TSE from decimalization, orders for interlisted stocks did not
migrate from US markets to the TSE.
Our results suggest that listing on the NYSE or Nasdaq decreases percentage bid-ask
spreads in Toronto and increases the share of Toronto-based order ﬂow from non-client (in-
stitutional) accounts. Responsible registered trader participation appears to fall for NYSE-
interlisted stocks but rise for Nasdaq-interlisted stocks. Our results also suggest that re-
sponsible registered trader (TSE market maker) proﬁts are not affected by US listing status.
These results are generally robust to different matching estimation techniques and thus pro-
vide useful information to ﬁrms deciding whether the signiﬁcant costs of becoming interlisted
are sufﬁciently compensated for by lower transaction costs and/or increased trade volume
from institutions and foreign investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the estimation ap-
proach. Section 3 provides a brief description of the relevant institutional details. Section 4
describes the data and the selection criteria used. Section 5 presents the Monte Carlo simu-
3Not surprisingly, there is also considerable evidence of market segmentation between other countries and US
markets (e.g., Werner and Kleidon (1996) ﬁnd evidence for UK and US equity markets). For other studies of
international dual-listing, see Noronha, et al. (1996), Domowitz et al. (1998), and Smith and Soﬁanos (1997).
3lation results. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Estimation Approach
Two possible approaches to estimating the effect of being interlisted on a US exchange are:
1. “Transitional window” approach restricts attention to the subset of TSE-listed ﬁrms
that became interlisted on a US exchange over the sample period. An estimate of the
impact of becoming interlisted is then constructed by comparing the trading properties
of these ﬁrms over a period prior to the date at which they became interlisted with
the trading properties of these ﬁrms over a period after the date at which they became
interlisted.
2. “Matched sample” approach involves pairing each interlisted ﬁrm with a non-interlisted
ﬁrm that, otherwise, has similar properties. An estimate of the effect of being interlisted
is obtained by comparing the trading properties of these pairs of stocks.
The transitional window approach was used by Foerster and Karolyi (1998) to examine a
sample of 52 TSE securities that became interlisted on US exchanges between January 1981
and December 1990. Using a 60 day window surrounding interlisting, they ﬁnd that, after
controlling for price level, trade size and trading volume effects, overall posted and effective
spreads on the TSE decrease after interlisting.
The transitional window approach was also used by Noronha, et al. (1996) to examine 91
NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks that became interlisted on the London Stock Exchange and
68 NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks that became interlisted on Tokyo Stock Exchange between
1983 and 1989. They ﬁnd that, in spite of increased competition from other market makers,
spreads do not decrease on the US exchange following interlisting. They argue that interlist-
ing increases the level of informed trading and thus any negative pressures on the spread
from increased competition are offset by an increase in the adverse selection component of
the spread.
4In a different context, the transitional window approach is used by Barclay (1997), Christie
and Huang (1994), and Bessembinder (1998) to examine the change in market liquidity of
stocks that move from the Nasdaq to AMEX and NYSE; and by Clyde, et al. (1997) to examine
the change in spreads of stocks that voluntarily move from the AMEX to the Nasdaq.
The transitional window approach has at least two signiﬁcant problems:
• The sample of securities that become interlisted in any given year is small. Unfortu-
nately, the sample size cannot be increased by simply increasing the length of the time
horizon considered without introducing serious sources of bias. In particular, the rapid
pace of innovation in ﬁnancial institutions means that the trading properties of a group
of securities in the past are probably not directly comparable to the trading properties
of a similar group of securities today.
• It is difﬁcult to determine the optimal length of the time window used for comparison.
On the one hand, a relatively short time window may not be long enough to identify
the long-term impact of becoming interlisted. It takes time for a stable pattern of order
ﬂow to emerge after a listing change. There are lots of contaminating effects, reﬂecting
transitional aspects that may not characterize outcomes in the long run (rebalancing
of portfolios for institutional reasons, information release associated with interlisting,
etc.). On the other hand, a longer time window may introduce another source of bias if
newly interlisted ﬁrms tend to be growing rapidly. The average ﬁrm size prior to becom-
ing interlisted may be signiﬁcantly different from the average ﬁrm size after becoming
interlisted. It is well established that trading properties are closely related to ﬁrm size.
Because of these limitations of the transitional window approach, this paper uses several
variants of the matched sample approach. The matched sample approach allows us to consider
a much larger sample of securities and provides a snapshot of the long-term impact of becom-
ing interlisted. Speciﬁcally, the transitional window approach used by Foerster and Karolyi
(1998) limits their study to ﬁve NYSE-interlisted stocks, seven AMEX-interlisted stocks and
40 Nasdaq-interlisted stocks. In contrast, our matched sample approach allows us to examine
560 NYSE-interlisted stocks, 19 AMEX-interlisted stocks, and 55 Nasdaq-interlisted stocks.
2.1 Matching Estimates
Heckman et al. (1997,1998) use the method of matching to evaluate the success of a job train-
ing programme. Their evaluation technique compares the mean post-programme earnings
of programme participants with the mean earnings of “comparable” non-participants. We
use a similar technique to compare the trading properties (e.g. percentage bid-ask spread) of
ﬁrms interlisted on a US exchange with the trading properties of “comparable” non-interlisted
ﬁrms. Differences in the trading properties of the two groups are attributed to being in-
terlisted.
As much as possible, we adopt the notation in Heckman et al. (1997,1998). The sam-
ple of securities listed on the TSE can be divided into four main groups: NYSE-interlisted
stocks (identiﬁed by subscript nyse), AMEX-interlisted stocks (identiﬁed by subscript amex),
Nasdaq-interlisted stocks (identiﬁed by subscript nasd), and securities that are not interlisted
on a US exchange (identiﬁed by subscript 0). Let YE denote the trading property outcome that
would occur if the security has listing attribute E ∈ {nyse,amex,nasd,0}. Let DE = 1 if the
ﬁrm has listing attribute E; DE = 0 otherwise. The trading property outcome observed for a
ﬁrm is Y = DnyseYnyse +DamexYamex +DnasdYnasd +D0Y0. The effect of being interlisted on US
exchange L ∈ {nyse,amex,nasd} is denoted ∆L, where ∆L = YL − Y0.
Each ﬁrm has observed characteristics X, which can be partitioned into two not-necessarily
mutually exclusive sets of variables, (T,Z), where the T variables determine the trading
property outcome and the Z variables determine whether or not the ﬁrm decides to become
interlisted. In practice, ﬁrm characteristics often impact both the listing decision and the
ﬁrm’s trading properties. For example, the amount of business a ﬁrm conducts outside of
Canada obviously could impact its decision about whether to become interlisted but it may
also impact its percentage bid-ask spread if this business creates uncertainty and additional
informational asymmetries. The trading property associated with listing property E can then
6be written as a function of observables (T) and unobservables UE, where
YE = gE(T) + UE (1)
where E(UE) = 0 and gE is assumed to be a nonstochastic function. Unobservables include
ﬁrm characteristics such as the ﬁrm’s management style that directly impact trading prop-
erties, such as percentage bid-ask spreads (through adverse selection costs), but that are
difﬁcult, or impossible, to quantify.
The mean effect of being interlisted on a US exchange L ∈ {nyse,amex,nasd} on the trad-
ing property for a ﬁrm with characteristics X ∈ S, where S is a given set, is given by:
E(∆L|X,DL = 1) = gL(X) − g0(X) + E(UL − U0|X,DL = 1). (2)
The focus of this paper is to estimate the average effect of being interlisted on US exchange
L ∈ {nyse,amex,nasd}, which is given by:
ML(S) =
R
S E(∆L|X,DL = 1)dF(X|DL = 1)
R
S dF(X|DL = 1)
(3)
where S is a subset of the support of X given DL = 1. In practice, the choice of S can be non-
trivial if there does not exist a sufﬁcient number of ﬁrms with characteristic X such that either
DL = 1 or DL = 0. For example, if the matching characteristic is market capitalization, there
are no other ﬁrms listed on the TSE that come close to having the same market capitalization
as Northern Telecom Ltd. during the period under study. In the same vein, perhaps small
ﬁrms should also be excluded from S since they may be either unable to meet US listing
requirements or unable to justify/afford paying US listing fees. This is discussed further in
section 4.
Let IE denote the set of indices for ﬁrms with listing attribute E. We distinguish be-
tween the P trading properties of interest by using the subscript p ∈ {1,...,P}. To estimate
the effect of being interlisted on US exchange L for each ﬁrm i ∈ IL, trading property Y
p
Li
is compared to an average of the outcomes Y
p
0j for matched ﬁrms j ∈ I0 in the sample of
non-interlisted ﬁrms. Matches are constructed on the basis of observed characteristics X.
Typically, a non-interlisted ﬁrm receives a higher weight in constructing a match when its
7observed characteristics are “closer” to those of an interlisted ﬁrm i ∈ IL, using a speciﬁc dis-
tance measure. The estimated change in a trading property for each ﬁrm i in the sample of









where WL(i,j) is a positive valued weight function, deﬁned such that
P
j∈I0 WL(i,j) = 1 ∀i ∈
IL , and NL and N0 are the number of ﬁrms in IL and I0, respectively. The weighting function
assigns weights to the trading properties of each non-interlisted ﬁrm based on distances in
the space of observed characteristics, X. Different matching estimates can be constructed by
using different weighting functions and/or different distance measures.
In general, an estimate of the average effect of being interlisted on US exchange L on

















We consider three alternative matching estimators that can be constructed based on (5). A
neighborhood C(Xi) is deﬁned for ﬁrm i ∈ IL. Neighbors for ﬁrm i are non-interlisted ﬁrms
j ∈ I0 for which Xj ∈ C(Xi). The ﬁrms matched to i are those ﬁrms in set Ai where
Ai = {j ∈ I0|Xj ∈ C(Xi)}.
The alternative estimators are deﬁned as follows:
Nearest neighbor (1-NN) matching estimator: For each i ∈ IL, select the match
C(Xi) = min
j
||Xi − Xj||, j ∈ I0
where ||·|| is a norm. For the univariate case, the distance measure we select is (xi−xj)/(xi+
xj). Ai is a singleton set except for ties that are broken by a random draw. The weighting
scheme for the nearest-neighbor estimator assigns all the weight to the single match: WL(i,j)
equals 1 if j ∈ Ai and equals 0 otherwise.4
4We also considered a variant of the nearest-neighbor matching estimator (known as caliper matching), where
8k-NN matching estimator with uniform weights: Now, Ai is a set of k closest ﬁrms to
ﬁrm i according to the distance measured employed. The weights are WL(i,j) equals 1/k if
j ∈ Ai and equals 0 otherwise. We focus on the case where k = 2.
k-NN matching estimator with triangular weights: Now, rank the k closest ﬁrms to
ﬁrm i, where r = 1 is the closest, r = 2 is the next closest, etc. Then, the weights are
WL(i,j) = 2(k − r + 1)/(k(k + 1)) if j ∈ Ai and equals 0 otherwise.
Kernel-based matching estimators: As k increases, k-NN matching estimators become ef-
fectively Nadaraya-Watson kernel-based matching estimators. Univariate kernel-based match-
ing estimates based on characteristic x ∈ X are constructed as follows. Kernel matching sets





where Kik = K((xi − xk)/h) is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth parameter. We use a


























To investigate the sensitivity of predictions to the bandwidth parameter, we ﬁrst consider two
bandwidth parameters: h1 = 1.059sN
−1/5






















Intuitively, the bandwidth parameter controls the amount of smoothing across ﬁrms: A larger
value causes the matching estimate to place more weight on ﬁrms that are further away, in
terms of the matching characteristic. The choice of h1 is motivated by the desire to minimize
the approximate mean-integrated squared error (AMISE). This essentially equates the trade-
off between the bias and the variance of the kernel estimate (see Pagan and Ullah (p. 24,
matches are made to interlisted ﬁrm i only if there exists a non-interlisted ﬁrm j such that
||Xi − Xj|| < ε, j ∈ I0
where ε is a pre-speciﬁed tolerance. Otherwise, no match is undertaken, and ﬁrm i is omitted. This procedure is
designed to circumvent the problem of a substantial gap between i and j. In practice, caliper matching produces
similar results to that of eliminating the largest interlisted ﬁrms, which we consider later.
91999)). The choice of h2 is motivated by the observation that when constructing bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals, the criterion should be to minimize the potential bias of the estimate
since the variance will be “dealt with” through the bootstrap repetitions. It turns out that
the bias is minimized by a bandwidth parameter that is proportional to n−1/3, instead of the
usual n−1/5 (see Davison and Hinkley (p. 228, 1997)).
Because of the signiﬁcant heterogeneity in ﬁrm market capitalization, we also consider a
variable window-width kernel estimator where Kik = K((xi − xk)/hmin
i ) and hmin
i is distance
of ﬁrm i from its closest nearest neighbor.
3 Institutional Details
The TSE faces intense competition from US exchanges. In 1998, 58.7% of the total value of
trading volume on the TSE was comprised of trading in securities that were also listed on a
US exchange. At the end of 1998, 220 Canadian ﬁrms were interlisted and 25% of trading in
these stocks occurs in US markets.5
The TSE, Nasdaq, NYSE, and AMEX have concurrent regular trading hours between
9:30AM and 4:00PM. The TSE operates as a transparent electronic limit order market, with
a responsible registered trader (RRT) assigned to each security.6 TSE member ﬁrms can in-
ternalize order ﬂow: after receiving an order, the member ﬁrm’s “upstairs traders” can either
trade the order with a member ﬁrm account or with another customer order prior to sending
it to the consolidated limit order book.
The NYSE and AMEX have similar market structures: an auction market with ﬂoor trad-
ing and specialist intermediation. Unlike the RRT, the specialist has exclusive knowledge of
the limit order book. Most NYSE stocks and some AMEX stocks are also traded on the US
regional exchanges with market orders executed against the best posted quote in the consoli-
5Source: TSE 1998 Annual Report.
6The RRT’s main responsibilities are: (i) to contribute to market liquidity; (ii) to moderate price volatility;
(iii) to maintain a continuous two-sided market; and (iv) to ﬁll odd lot orders and orders eligible for a Minimum
Guaranteed Fill (MGF).
10dated limit order book. Often, smaller retail orders are sent to the US regional exchanges in
return for a payment for order ﬂow. In partial response to this competition, the NYSE spe-
cialist often posts a wide spread but then attempts to obtain price improvement for incoming
orders. Nasdaq operates as a dealer market with several competing dealers posting quotes.
Prices of larger trades may be negotiated on a one-on-one basis with each dealer. Preferenc-
ing arrangements and competition from Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) play a
particularly important role on the Nasdaq.
US exchanges trade shares of Canadian ﬁrms in US dollars, but as ordinary securities
(not as American Depository Receipts (ADRs)). Thus, from a legal perspective, a ﬁrm’s shares
traded on US and Canadian exchanges are equivalent. There are, however, important logis-
tical considerations, including: foreign exchange transaction costs and risks; different settle-
ment procedures; and brokerage ﬁrms may not be members of all exchanges. While US dollar
trading accounts are relatively common in Canada, very few US retail investors would have
the same easy access to Canadian markets. During the period under consideration, there
were important restrictions on Canadian retail trade interlisted stocks on Nasdaq (which was
considered an OTC market by Canadian regulators). These restrictions meant that Canadian
retail trade in Nasdaq-interlisted stocks must be sent to a Canadian market unless the price
was strictly better on Nasdaq.
As discussed in Aggarwal and Angel (1998), the listing requirements and the market struc-
tures of each of the US exchanges tends to attract different ﬁrm types. A dealer market, such
as the Nasdaq, provides strong incentives for broker-dealers to promote a stock which tends
to be attractive for newer, technology ﬁrms with possibly little, or no proﬁt record. In contrast,
NYSE rules explicitly prevent the specialist from generating order ﬂow and require prospec-
tive ﬁrms to have a history of proﬁts prior to listing. As a result, the NYSE tends to attract
larger, more established ﬁrms. The AMEX tends to attract smaller ﬁrms that may not meet
the more stringent NYSE listing requirements or ﬁrms that have multiple classes of share-
holders (something discouraged on the NYSE). In the subsequent analysis, it is important
to remember that apparent differences between the effect of interlisting on these exchanges
11may be a result of differences in the type of ﬁrm that tends to interlist on the exchange, not a
direct result of differences in market structure.
4 Data
From the 1998 TSE Equity History database, we obtain records of executed trades (board7
and odd lot) and inside quote revisions for all TSE-listed securities.8 A beneﬁt to using data
from 1998 is that it provides us with a sufﬁcient sample of non-interlisted stocks with which to
match the largest interlisted stocks. During the past few years, many of these previously non-
interlisted stocks have subsequently become interlisted on a US exchange (e.g. Bank of Nova
Scotia).9 We restrict attention to a sample of 451 actively traded common stocks of Canadian-
based companies with market capitalizations greater than C$100 million on Dec. 31, 1997.10
The ﬁnal sample is composed of 317 non-interlisted ﬁrms, 55 Nasdaq-interlisted ﬁrms, 19
AMEX-interlisted ﬁrms, and 60 NYSE-interlisted ﬁrms. Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of
the distribution of ﬁrms by market capitalization and average daily trading dollar volume.
Notice that of the largest ﬁfteen ﬁrms included in the sample, 11 are NYSE-interlisted and
one is AMEX-interlisted. It will be especially challenging to ﬁnd suitable matches for these
ﬁrms on the basis of market capitalization. Figure 2 shows that these distributional problems
are reduced for the smaller ﬁrms in the sample. While it is tempting to focus solely on the
smaller ﬁrms, it is important to emphasize that similar distributional problems exist in most
other previous applications of matched samples and therefore it is important to investigate
the impact of including the “outliers”.
7Typically, orders in units of 100 shares.
8Refer to Davies (2003) for additional details about this database.
9This is somewhat reassuring since it implies that there would be little beneﬁt to using a propensity score
adjustment for the propensity to list on a US exchange. Speciﬁcally, it suggests that all major Canadian companies
have high propensities to list on a US exchange – actual listing decisions have been driven by historical factors.
10Our sample excludes securities that were under suspension, securities that were added or eliminated from
the TSE stock list at any time during 1998, and securities that had a monthly trading dollar volume less than
C$100,000 during any month in the sample period. For convenience, we also exclude any security that changed
its symbol during 1998.
12For each ﬁrm, the percentage bid-ask spread is calculated as 2∗(ask−bid)/(ask+bid) and
the average is based on the latest bid and ask price posted at ﬁve minute intervals during
regular trading hours.11
For the subperiod from January to July 1998, the TSE Equity History Database provides
information about whether executed trades involved orders submitted for a client, a non-
client, or a registered trader (RT) account. Non-client account orders can be further classiﬁed
as either an inventory account or a non-inventory account order. Inventory account orders
are orders involving the member ﬁrm’s liability account managed by the member ﬁrm’s up-
stairs traders. These trades may originate either as upstairs trades that are executed as
“put-throughs” or as trades against the public limit order book. We use this trade record in-
formation to examine the effect of being interlisted on the trading behavior of different market
participants.
The estimation results presented are obtained using market capitalization as the match-
ing characteristic.12 In general, larger ﬁrms are more actively traded, have narrower bid-ask
spreads, are held by more institutional investors, and are more widely followed (and thus
have lower associated adverse selection costs). Thus, for most purposes, market capitaliza-
tion provides the most obvious characteristic over which to match ﬁrms. The addition of other
matching characteristics (e.g. share price, market beta) may or may not improve these results
11Other measures, such as an effective bid-ask spread, are difﬁcult to construct using the available database.
The TSE Equity History Database records all quote and trade timestamps at six second intervals: as a result, it
is difﬁcult to order sequentially all trades and quotes in periods with high trade volumes. Because price improve-
ment is much less common on the TSE, there should be little or no difference between the effective spread and the
observed spread.
12Doukas and Switzer (2000) ﬁnd evidence of mild segmentation between Canadian and US markets, resulting
in signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns from an announcement by a Canadian-based ﬁrm of its intention to
become interlisted on a US exchange. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms have a cumulative abnormal return of
2.17% during the period −1 day to +1 day around the announcement date. To the extent that becoming interlisted
impacts the market capitalization of interlisted ﬁrms, our results may be biased from using market capitalization
as the matching characteristics. The bias is likely to be very small since the listing effect is small relative to the
large number of other factors inﬂuencing ﬁrm size and relative to the differences in market capitalization among
ﬁrms in the sample.
13- in order to focus on the estimation method, rather than the data inputs, we do not explore
this here.13
5 Monte Carlo Simulation Results
The size-power properties of tests based on the various matching estimation approaches are
determined using Monte Carlo simulation. A similar approach has been used in the abnormal
performance literature.14 Kahle and Walkling (1996) simulate a typical ﬁnancial experiment
to explore how the ability to detect abnormal performance varies between tests using matched
samples based on ﬁrm size only and tests using matched samples based on ﬁrm size and in-
dustry classiﬁcation. They show that tests based on industry-matched samples are more
powerful than pure size matches and that the actual database source of the industry classiﬁ-
cations matters. These results are revisited in Lie (2001) who shows that the methods used
can produce severely biased test statistics. Unlike Kahle and Walkling (1996) and Lie (2001),
we focus on the matching estimation approach (i.e. nearest neighbor versus kernel-based es-
timation) rather than the inputs (i.e. ﬁrm characteristics) used in the matching.
We proceed as follows. For each of 10,000 Monte Carlo replications:
1. We randomly select without replacement N stocks out of the total sample of 451 ﬁrms
(no distinction is made for listing status).15 The percentage bid-ask of each of these N
13In results not reported here, we use an approach similar to that used by Huang and Stoll (1996) that includes
additional ﬁrm characteristics. Speciﬁcally, for each ﬁrm j ∈ IL that is interlisted on exchange L, we select

















Oi is ﬁrm characteristic k for a non-interlisted ﬁrm i and x
k
Lj is ﬁrm characteristic k for interlisted ﬁrm
j. We match over the following three ﬁrm characteristics (obtained from Datastream): (i) the number of shares
outstanding; (ii) the share price; and (iii) the stock’s beta. We also consider the possibility of restricting matches
to within the same TSE-provided industry code (industrial, mining, and oil). While different in magnitude, these
results lie within the conﬁdence intervals found using market capitalization as the only matching characteristic.
14See also Barber and Lyon (1996).
15We also conducted Monte Carlo simulations in which the ﬁrms were randomly selected with replacement. The
14stocks is artiﬁcially changed by θ: ˆ Yi = Yi + θ,
2. Each of the N stocks are “matched” with a “hypothetical” ﬁrm created using a weighting
of the remaining 451 − N ﬁrms. The weighting scheme used depends on the matching
estimation technique.
3. Based on a comparison of the N stocks with induced differences and their hypothetical
matched pairs, we then construct a two-sided nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test
of size α of the difference in bid-ask spreads between the two groups.
Figure 3 illustrates the power of 1-NN, 2-NN (equal weights) and 3-NN (triangular weights)
matching techniques for different levels of induced changes in the percentage bid-ask spread,
θ. The k-NN matching techniques are compared with a random selection approach that ran-
domly matches two ﬁrms independently of their market capitalization (or any other ﬁrm char-
acteristic). In some sense, the “random” selection approach provides a lower bound for the
power of the matching estimates. In comparison with this lower bound, using market capital-
ization as a matching characteristic generates a signiﬁcant improvement in power.
All three k-NN matching techniques produce similar results. Notice, however, as k in-
creases (i.e. as nearest neighbor estimates are constructed over additional closest ﬁrms), the
power curve is biased away from zero and shifted to the right. The intuition for the bias
in the power curve is as follows. Recall that bid-ask spreads (Y ) are a function of market
capitalization (X) and unobservables (U),
Yi = g(Xi) + Ui.
Then in our simulation, the estimated difference between the two samples for a ﬁrm with
market capitalization ˜ X is
ˆ ∆( ˜ X) = g( ˜ X) + θ −
X
i




A bias is introduced because
P
i Wig(Xi) 6= g(
P
i WiXi) except for the 1-NN matching esti-
mates. Increasing the number of ﬁrms given positive weights (Wi > 0) and/or increasing the
problem with this approach is that the nearest neighbor of a ﬁrm is often itself - this increases the power of the
1-NN estimation method relative to the other approaches.
15dispersion of weights in the matching estimate (either by increasing k in nearest neighbor
estimates or by increasing h in kernel estimates) increases this bias. In the case of k-NN
estimates, the bias is made worse because the Xi values are not equispaced and do not follow
a uniform distribution.
While increasing the number of ﬁrms given positive matching weights increases the bias,
it also helps reduce the variance associated with unobservable ﬁrm characteristics, since
plimn→∞n−1/2(˜ U −
Pn
i=1 WiUi) = b, where b is a constant. Clearly, there is a trade-off be-
tween bias and variance. The optimal matching technique then depends on: (i) the number
of matched pairs; and (ii) how small is the difference we are attempting to measure. This is
further illustrated by ﬁgures 4 and 5.
Figure 4 illustrates the power of the kernel-based matching estimate for bandwidth pa-
rameters h1, h2, and hmin
i (variable bandwidth) for different levels of induced changes in the
percentage bid-ask spread, θ. The ﬁgure also illustrates the 1-NN results for comparison
purposes. The theoretical bandwidth parameters are much too large - this is caused by the
extremely large differences in market capitalization of the largest few ﬁrms. As a result, the
power curves of the kernel estimates are biased to the right, much in the same way as in-
creasing k did for the k-NN estimates. In fact, for small positive induced differences, there
is a region in which the simplistic random match approach actually performs better than the
kernel-based matching estimate with bandwidth parameters h1 and h2. The variable band-
width kernel estimates appear to perform much better than ﬁxed bandwidth kernel estimates
- the variable bandwidth approach may therefore be appropriate when there is signiﬁcant het-
erogeneity across ﬁrms (as is the case in most market microstructure applications).
Figure 5 considers how the power of tests based on nearest neighbor estimates change with
the number of matched pairs N. The results are based on 20,000 Monte Carlo replications
in which the induced difference is +0.5s(Y ) for 50% of the replications and −0.5s(Y ) for 50%
of the replications, where s(Y ) is the standard deviation of the percentage bid-ask spreads
of the stocks in the sample. As expected, the power of all of the tests decreases with the
number of matched pairs. Interestingly, the highest level of power is obtained using the h2 =
161.059sN
−1/3
0 kernel-based matching estimate, while the worst level of power is obtained by
using the h1 = 1.059sN
−1/5
0 kernel based matching estimate. This highlights how important
the choice of bandwidth parameter can be.
In this example, four of the ﬁve alternative estimates provide higher power than the stan-
dard nearest neighbor matching estimate. This suggests that if the expected difference is
large and the number of matched pairs is small, then minimizing the variance is relatively
more important than the estimation bias and we should use a matching estimate that places
more weight on more distant ﬁrms.
In ﬁgure 6, we illustrate an analogous power graph for a smaller induced difference of
0.2s(Y ) for 50% of the replications and −0.2s(Y ) 50% of the replications. Clearly, all of the
matching estimation techniques have much less power than the previous case. Again, the
highest level of power is obtained using the h2 kernel-based matching estimate. The worst
power is obtained using the nearest-neighbor (1-NN) based approach.
6 Results on the impact of interlisting
With these insights into the power properties of our matching estimates, we proceed to esti-
mate the actual effect of interlisting using the real data. The matching estimate of the impact
of interlisting on exchange L for ﬁrms with market capitalization of ˜ X is:
ˆ ∆L( ˜ X) = gL( ˜ X) −
X
i∈I0




This is analogous to equation (7) for our simulation results. Our Monte Carlo results tell us
that the estimation bias is such that our test power will be higher for negative differences
in bid-ask spreads and lower for positive differences in bid-ask spreads. Our Monte Carlo
results also suggest that, because of the relatively small sample of AMEX-interlisted ﬁrms,
additional “smoothing” may be lead to more powerful tests of the impact of interlisting on
AMEX.
176.1 Nonparametric Tests
Table 1 presents the Wilcoxon signed rank tests for NYSE-, AMEX- and Nasdaq-interlisted
stocks. There is signiﬁcant evidence that interlisting on the NYSE causes a decrease in
percentage bid-ask spreads for trading on the TSE.16 The results for AMEX- and Nasdaq-
interlisted stocks depend on the estimation technique used. For Nasdaq-interlisted stocks,
there is a signiﬁcant negative difference (at the 5% signiﬁcance level) for all cases except for
the 1-NN matching estimates. For AMEX-interlisted stocks, there is a signiﬁcant negative dif-
ference for only the kernel-based matching estimates with bandwidth parameters h1 and h2.
As demonstrated in our Monte Carlo analysis, this reﬂects the additional power (and higher
potential type 1 error) of tests using kernel-based estimates to detect negative differences in
bid-ask spreads.
We now proceed to investigate whether interlisting results in changes in the share of order
ﬂow from institutional investors. Non-client account orders provide a useful proxy for the
level of institutional trade in a security. It is difﬁcult to predict whether interlisting will have
a positive or negative effect on the share of orders for non-client accounts. On the one hand,
the share of order ﬂow involving non-client accounts may be higher for interlisted stocks if
they are more attractive to institutional investors. Interlisted stocks may be more attractive
to institutions for a variety of reasons: (i) ﬁrms interlisted on a US exchange may be subject
to more stringent disclosure and accounting rules; (ii) ﬁrms interlisted on a US exchange
generally have a greater following by ﬁnancial analysts and the media; (iii) stocks interlisted
on a US exchange may be easier to unload quickly in large quantities if unexpected news
arises.
On the other hand, the share of order ﬂow involving non-client accounts may be lower for
interlisted stocks if institutional order ﬂow tends to migrate to the US exchange. While retail
order ﬂow is largely constrained to trade on the domestic exchange, institutions have greater
discretion as to which exchange they send their orders to. Under certain circumstances, they
16This is despite recent evidence that NYSE specialists participate less actively in Canadian-based ﬁrms in-
terlisted on the NYSE (Bacidore and Soﬁanos (2002)).
18may prefer to send their orders to the US exchange if they think that by doing so they will
receive better execution (i.e. better current prices) and/or will incur lower informational costs
(i.e. better future prices).
Table 2 reports that listing on the NYSE or Nasdaq results in a signiﬁcant increase in
the percentage of order ﬂow involving non-client orders. Thus, decreases in the percentage
bid-ask spread coincide with increases in institutional order ﬂow. The effect is not signiﬁcant
for AMEX-interlisted ﬁrms.
We now examine whether the existence of alternative trading facilities and competing US
market makers inﬂuences the RRT participation and RRT trading revenues. To construct an
estimate of RRT gross trading revenues, we assume that:
1. The RRT begins the sample period with a position of zero in all stocks of responsibility;
2. The RRT closes out his accumulated position at the end of the sample period at the last
recorded transaction price.
Let Kt
i denote the number of trades for security i involving the RRT during trading day
t ∈ [1,T]. Let ni(t,k) denote the number of shares of security i sold (negative values indicate
purchases) at trade number k ∈ [1,Kt
i] on trading day t, and let Pi(t,k) denote the correspond-
ing transaction price. Average daily RRT gross trading revenues in security i over the sample



























Table 3 reports the estimates of the impact on RRT participation and RRT gross trading rev-
enues from being interlisted on a US exchange. The results suggest that there is no signiﬁcant
impact on RRT trading revenues from interlisting on any of the US exchanges.
The effect of interlisting on RRT participation is less clear. There is weak evidence that
interlisting on Nasdaq and the NYSE has opposite effects on RRT participation levels: RRT
participation levels decrease for NYSE-interlisted stocks, RRT participation levels increase
19for Nasdaq-interlisted stocks. Thus, the competitive response of Toronto-based market mak-
ers to the multiple dealer trading environment for Nasdaq stocks appears to be stronger than
that of the specialist trading environment of the NYSE. Overall, there does not appear to
be a direct relationship between changes in TSE market maker participation and changes in
bid-ask spreads.
6.2 Conﬁdence Intervals
In this section, we investigate whether our previous results hold when examining average
differences in percentage bid-ask spreads, rather than a non-parametric approach. We con-
struct percentile-t bootstrap conﬁdence intervals for the average effect of being interlisted on
percentage bid-ask spreads. The double bootstrap procedure is described in the appendix.
Table 4 reports the effect of being interlisted on the average percentage bid-ask spread.
The average changes in the bid-ask spread from interlisting and their associated bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals generally correspond with the nonparametric test results. Speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd evidence that being interlisted on the NYSE signiﬁcantly decreases trading costs on
the TSE. The change in percentage bid-ask spreads is economically signiﬁcant, around 0.2 to
0.4 percent. The effect is also negative for AMEX- and Nasdaq-interlisted stocks, although
their bootstrap conﬁdence intervals include zero. Importantly, the conﬁdence intervals for
1-NN estimates are generally larger than those using kernel-based estimates. This reﬂects
the higher variance of standard nearest neighbor estimation relative to approaches that have
positive weights on distant ﬁrms.
Finally, we investigate whether our conﬁdence intervals can be narrowed by eliminating
the largest interlisted ﬁrms for which there are no good matches. To do this, we exclude
the 11 largest NYSE-interlisted ﬁrms and the largest AMEX-interlisted ﬁrm (Imperial Oil
Ltd.) from the sample and re-estimate the bootstrap conﬁdence intervals.17 The estimated
17Ideally, one would like to introduce a propensity score adjustment, similar to those normally used in the labor
economics literature, in order to eliminate the largest ﬁrms which “almost always” are interlisted. Unfortunately,
this is difﬁcult to do in this context due to the small number of ﬁrms which become interlisted in any given year
20conﬁdence intervals are similar – suggesting that our results are not driven by the largest
ﬁrms.
7 Conclusion
Despite their apparent simplicity, standard nearest neighbor (1-NN) matching estimation
techniques typically have less bias and comparable power to more complex matching esti-
mation techniques for measuring differences in bid-ask spreads. When estimating differences
using a small number of matched pairs, however, it is desirable to use matching estimates that
place weight on more distant ﬁrms (e.g. k-NN (k > 1) nearest-neighbor matching estimates
or kernel-based matching estimates). Essentially, there is an important trade-off between
estimation bias and variance.
Bootstrap conﬁdence intervals of changes to average bid-ask spreads are very wide – sug-
gesting that it is preferable to use non-parametric approaches rather than calculating aver-
ages to compare the impact of listing. Narrower conﬁdence intervals can be obtained by using
matching estimates that place weight on more distant ﬁrms relative to the standard nearest
neighbor approach.
We show that interlisting on the NYSE or Nasdaq has a signiﬁcant negative effect on
percentage bid-ask spreads posted in Toronto and results in signiﬁcantly higher share of
order ﬂow from non-client (institutional) accounts. RRT participation decreases for NYSE-
interlisted ﬁrms but increases for Nasdaq-interlisted ﬁrms. US listing status does not have
a direct impact on RRT gross trading revenues. These results are veriﬁed for robustness by
using a variety of different matching estimates.
and because of the small number of ﬁrms in general.
21A Appendix: Bootstrap Conﬁdence Intervals
Percentile–t bootstrap conﬁdence intervals for the estimate ˆ M(L,p) are constructed using a
“double” bootstrap procedure.18 The double bootstrap procedure is necessary because of the
lack of a tractable analytical expression for the standard error of the ﬁrst level bootstrap
matching estimate.
Denote the number of ﬁrst-level bootstraps by B1, indexing them by b1, and the number
of second-level bootstraps by B2, indexing them by b2. B1 is chosen such that α(B1 + 1) is an
integer, where 2α is the desired conﬁdence level. We select B1 = 999 and B2 = 199. For each
bootstrap repetition b1 = 1,...,B1, the ﬁrst-level bootstrap proceeds as follows:
1. N0 stocks are randomly selected with replacement from the set of non-interlisted stocks
I0. Also, NL stocks are randomly selected with replacement from the set of interlisted
stocks IL. Denote the set of indices for the bootstrap sample of non-interlisted stocks by
I∗
0(b1) and the set of indices for the bootstrap sample of stocks interlisted on US exchange
L by I∗
L(b1).
























3. Using the sample of stocks I∗
0(b1) and I∗
L(b1), a second-level bootstrap is conducted.
Each repetition, b2 = 1,...,B2 of the second-level bootstrap proceeds as follows:
(a) Randomly select with replacement N0 stocks from the set of stocks I∗
0(b1) and ran-
domly select with replacement NL stocks from the set of stocks I∗
L(b1). Denote
the set of indices for the second-level bootstrap sample of non-interlisted stocks
by I∗∗
0 (b2,b1) and the set of indices for the bootstrap sample of stocks interlisted on
US exchange L by I∗∗
L (b2,b1).
18We also consider percentile bootstrap conﬁdence intervals based on a “single” bootstrap procedure. Similar
results are obtained.
























4. Using the estimates M∗∗
b2,b1(L,p) from the second-level bootstrap, the standard error σ∗
b1

























5. Using the estimated standard error, σ∗
b1, the bootstrap t statistic is constructed as: t∗
b1 =
[M∗
b1(L,p) − ˆ M(L,p)]/σ∗
b1.
Using the estimates M∗
























The bootstrap t statistics t∗
b1 are sorted from smallest to largest such that t∗
1 ≤ t∗




α(B1+1) and ˆ t∗
1−α = t∗
(1−α)(B1+1). The percentile–t bootstrap conﬁdence interval
with 2α level of conﬁdence is deﬁned as
h
ˆ M(L,p) − ˆ t∗
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of distribution of ﬁrms by market capitalization and average daily dollar
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of distribution of ﬁrms by market capitalization and average daily dollar
























































Figure 3: Power graph of two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test (α = 0.05) based on 1-NN,
2-NN (equal weights) and 3-NN (triangular weights) matching estimates. Random Match
indicates a test based on matched pairs randomly selected wihtout reference to any matching
characteristics. Power is plotted as a function of the induced difference (expressed in standard


























































Figure 4: Power graph of two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test (α = 0.05) based on kernel-
based matching estimates with bandwidth parameters: h1 = 1.059sN
−1/5




i (variable bandwidth). The power of 1-NN matching estimates are also reported for
comparison purposes. Power is plotted as a function of the induced difference (expressed in
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Figure 5: Power graph of two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test (α = 0.05) based on 1-NN, 2-NN
(equal weights), and 3-NN (triangular weights) nearest neighbor matching estimates and the
h1 = 1.059sN
−1/5
0 , h2 = 1.059sN
−1/3
0 and hmin
i (variable bandwidth) kernel-based matching
estimates. The power of the test is plotted as a function of the number of matched pairs.
Based on 20,000 Monte Carlo replications. The induced difference is +0.5s(Y ) for 50% of the
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Figure 6: Power graph of two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test (α = 0.05) based on 1-NN, 2-NN
(equal weights), and 3-NN (triangular weights) nearest neighbor matching estimates and the
h1 = 1.059sN
−1/5
0 , h2 = 1.059sN
−1/3
0 and hmin
i (variable bandwidth) kernel-based matching
estimates. The power of the test is plotted as a function of the number of matched pairs.
Based on 20,000 Monte Carlo replications. The induced difference is +0.2s(Y ) for 50% of the
replications and −0.2s(Y ) for 50% of the replications.
32Table 1: Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the impact of interlisting on percentage bid-
ask spread. The average percentage bid-ask spread is calculated using observations at
5 minute intervals during regular trading hours. W is the smaller of the positive and negative
rank sums. Sign indicates whether the impact of interlisting was positive or negative when
the Wilcoxon test is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
NYSE-Interlisted AMEX-Interlisted Nasdaq-Interlisted
Method N = 60 N = 19 N = 55
W p-value Sign W p-value Sign W p-value Sign
1-NN 496.5 0.000 [−] 86 0.738 547 0.062
2-NN (equal) 354 0.000 [−] 58 0.145 415 0.003 [−]
3-NN (triangular) 322 0.000 [−] 56 0.123 416 0.003 [−]
Kernel (h1) 180 0.000 [−] 23 0.002 [−] 333 0.000 [−]
Kernel (h2) 218 0.000 [−] 34 0.012 [−] 314 0.000 [−]
Kernel (hmin
i ) 410 0.000 [−] 67 0.275 438 0.005 [−]
33Table 2: Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the impact of interlisting on the percentage
of total order ﬂow involving non-client accounts. W is the smaller of the positive and
negative rank sums. Sign indicates whether the impact of interlisting was positive or negative
when the Wilcoxon test is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
NYSE-Interlisted AMEX-Interlisted Nasdaq-Interlisted
Method N = 60 N = 19 N = 55
W p-value Sign W p-value Sign W p-value Sign
1-NN 245 0.000 [+] 54 0.104 427 0.002 [+]
2-NN (equal) 192 0.000 [+] 72 0.374 331 0.000 [+]
3-NN (triangular) 178 0.000 [+] 59 0.156 329 0.000 [+]
Kernel (h1) 93 0.000 [+] 48 0.060 215 0.000 [+]
Kernel (h2) 137 0.000 [+] 55 0.113 220 0.000 [+]
Kernel (hmin
i ) 218 0.000 [+] 68 0.293 372 0.000 [+]
34Table 3: Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the impact of interlisting on RRT gross trad-
ing revenues and the percentage of total order ﬂow involving RRT accounts. W is
the smaller of the positive and negative rank sums. Sign indicates whether the impact of
interlisting was positive or negative when the Wilcoxon test is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
NYSE-Interlisted AMEX-Interlisted Nasdaq-Interlisted
Method N = 60 N = 19 N = 55
W p-value Sign W p-value Sign W p-value Sign
RRT gross trading revenues
1-NN 805 0.209 76 0.465 714 0.319
2-NN (equal) 842 0.295 79 0.541 675 0.213
3-NN (triangular) 787 0.173 81 0.594 680 0.225
Kernel (h1) 737 0.095 66 0.258 655 0.168
Kernel (h2) 789 0.177 68 0.293 678 0.220
Kernel (hmin
i ) 787 0.173 84 0.679 717 0.328
Percentage of total order ﬂow involving RRT accounts
1-NN 765 0.134 81 0.594 606 0.084
2-NN (equal) 680 0.041 [−] 80 0.567 494 0.010 [+]
3-NN (triangular) 664 0.032 [−] 86 0.738 484 0.008 [+]
Kernel (h1) 530 0.002 [−] 79 0.595 581 0.030 [+]
Kernel (h2) 563 0.005 [−] 85 0.567 576 0.031 [+]
Kernel (hmin
i ) 699 0.056 84 0.738 510 0.014 [+]
35Table 4: Estimates of the impact of interlisting on average percentage bid-ask
spread. Results are reported for the sample of all interlisted ﬁrms and for the sample ex-
cluding the largest 12 interlisted ﬁrms. Reported percentile–t bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
are generated using B1 = 999 and B2 = 199. The average percentage bid-ask spread is calcu-
lated using observations at 5 minute intervals during regular trading hours.
Method NYSE-Interlisted AMEX-Interlisted Nasdaq-Interlisted
∆ (Average percentage bid-ask spread) [%]
Entire sample of interlisted ﬁrms:
h1 = 1.059s[N0]−1/5 −0.435 [−0.642,−0.218] −0.498 [−0.759,−0.167] −0.400 [−0.650,0.113]
h2 = 1.059s[N0]−1/3 −0.269 [−0.428,−0.067] −0.434 [−0.692,−0.152] −0.386 [−0.634,0.066]
hmin −0.205 [−0.350,0.121] −0.318 [−0.926,0.222] −0.357 [−0.772,0.088]
1-NN −0.213 [−0.462,−0.009] −0.543 [−1.518,0.007] −0.224 [−0.548,0.356]
2-NN −0.168 [−0.395,0.019] −0.488 [−1.389,0.020] −0.222 [−0.521,0.314]
3-NN −0.187 [−0.402,−0.010] −0.453 [−1.291,0.020] −0.279 [−0.564,0.232]
Sample excluding largest 12 interlisted ﬁrms (11 NYSE-interlisted, 1 AMEX-interlisted):
h1 = 1.059s[N0]−1/5 −0.508 [−0.747,−0.259] −0.529 [−0.781,−0.188]
h2 = 1.059s[N0]−1/3 −0.304 [−0.479,−0.082] −0.463 [−0.747,−0.120]
hmin −0.213 [−0.447,0.023] −0.336 [−0.948,0.240]
1-NN −0.236 [−0.524,0.019] −0.442 [−1.301,0.235]
2-NN −0.171 [−0.429,0.057] −0.526 [−1.292,0.080]
3-NN −0.204 [−0.446,0.012] −0.490 [−1.207,0.077]
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